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FOREWORD
More and more Arab societies are being buffeted by economic
forces their rulers cannot control. Until recently the Arab
populations largely have submitted to these economic stresses.
Lately, however, they have become more active in protest. This
study argues that in a large measure the increased activism is
due to the appearance of radical religious groups that have
exploited the popular discontent, focusing in particular on the
youth. Unable to find jobs, young people lack hope. Even the
prospect of a fulfilling family life is remote as long as they
are unemployed.
Hamas and Hizbollah are the two most famous of the religious
groups--Hamas operating in the Israeli occupied territories of
Gaza and the West Bank; Hizbollah, in southern Lebanon. Recent
publicity has spotlighted Hamas because of terrorist attacks it
has perpetrated inside Israel. But, as the study argues, both
Hamas and Hizbollah are significant far beyond any isolated
kidnappings or terrorist bombings. They are part of a movement
that is attempting to radicalize the whole Arab world.
This study seeks to alert U.S. policymakers and military
leaders to the larger potential danger posed by the groups. The
U.S. military, in particular, should take heed, the study finds,
because of a recent proposal to station U.S. forces in the very
center of the radicals' area of operation.
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SUMMARY
This study argues that Hamas and Hizbollah, the two main
religious groups fighting Israel, probably are more threatening
to U.S. interests than is generally believed. It discusses the
various openings that the groups were able to exploit to advance
themselves, and particularly how they profited from errors on the
Israelis' part.
At the same time, the study contends, there has been a
corresponding rise of religious radicalism in Israel. This means
that on both sides of the struggle--Jewish as well as Arab-extremism is gaining strength. It is going to be difficult, the
study concludes, to avoid a decisive confrontation between the
two forces.
To be sure, the Israelis have now begun peace talks with the
Arabs. However, the study points out, the talks are not
proceeding as well as might be hoped. In line with this, a
proposal has been put forward to overcome the present impasse.
This suggestion involves stationing U.S. troops on the Golan
Heights as guarantors of security.
The author believes that this idea should be scrutinized
carefully. The plan may result in the United States becoming
bogged down in the territories for an extended period. Moreover,
the level of violence in this area is such that positioning U.S.
troops there could jeopardize their safety.

HAMAS AND HIZBOLLAH:
THE RADICAL CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Introduction.
Hamas and Hizbollah are two groups that are well-known and
generally feared throughout the Middle East. They are the ones
most actively striving to bring about the destruction of Israel.
Beyond seeking the destruction of the Jewish state, they are part
of a movement that aims to destroy the Middle East state system.
The primary weapon with which the groups hope to accomplish
this is ideology. The radicals have formulated a call to action
that is extraordinarily persuasive to communities in despair.
Unemployed youth in particular respond to the notion that
violence is empowering and that to exist one must fight. This is
the essence of jihad, a concept that westerners consistently
misconstrue.
This study focuses on communities where the radicals have
had their greatest successes: the Palestinians living under
Israeli domination and the Shias of southern Lebanon.1 It shows
how misguided policies instituted by the Israelis helped Hamas
and Hizbollah to put down roots in these communities and
eventually to flourish.
What the West is confronting, the study warns, is a regional
Islamic revolution, brought about by Hamas and Hizbollah, with
the aid of other radical groups similarly inspired.
The study examines this unique species of radicalism so that
U.S. policymakers and military leaders can defend against it. It
first considers Hamas and conditions of life in the Gaza Strip,
Hamas's principal base of operations.2
The Genesis of Hamas.
The Gaza Strip, located on Israel's western boundary, is a
panhandle of land that juts from the Sinai Desert (see Figure 1).
It was, until 1967, a part of Egypt, but then Cairo lost it to
Israel in the Six-Day War. Unlike Jordan, which retains a claim
to the West Bank (similarly seized by Israel in that war), Egypt
subsequently renounced Gaza, meaning that, today, those
Palestinians living there are stateless. This significant fact
bears on the psychology of the Gazans. Were they to be forced to
leave the Strip their situation would become dire; they have no
internationally recognized status which they can claim.
Of the areas seized by Israel in the Six-Day War, Gaza
clearly is the most disadvantaged.3 It is a relatively small
place, measuring only 132 sq. miles (27 miles long and 3.5-6
miles wide). Of this, Palestinians inhabit a little over half;
the rest belongs to Jewish settlers. Roughly 800,000 Palestinians

live in the Strip, one of the most densely occupied areas on

earth.4 Of the total Palestinian population, about 600,000 have
been designated refugees by the U.N., and of that number 55
percent live in refugee camps, constructed for them after the
1948 Arab-Israeli War. Scant improvements have been made in the
camps since the war. Most have no sewage systems or street
lighting. The roads are not paved, and many of the buildings are

little more than shacks. Along with the camps, there is a major
city in the Strip, Gaza Town (see Figure 2). Unlike the camps it
is quite built up, with many highrises, and, in those
neighborhoods fronting on the Mediterranean, some charming homes,
although inevitably they are rundown.

Much is made of the dreadful living conditions in the Strip,
and they are bad, certainly; but relatively speaking they are not

so bad. To begin with, Gaza has an ideal location, on the
Mediterranean. It boasts a fine climate, 68<F128M>É<F255D> to
95<F128M>É <F255D>F in summer, and around 35<F128M>É<F255D> to
48<F128M>É<F255D> F throughout the winter months (November to
March). In appearance, Gaza Town is superior to many
neighborhoods of our larger cities. (It is about on a par with
Bulaq or Imbaba, two poor sections of Cairo.) Gaza appears to be
reasonably clean, with attempts made to remove the clutter in the
streets. This, however, is a difficult chore, due to the constant
rioting. One sees a great many burnt out cars lying about. The
Gazans use them for barricades when riots erupt.
The Palestinians comprise one of the most youthful
populations on earth.5 The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
in a 1991 publication listed 2,334,637 Palestinian refugees
worldwide, of which 469,385 were in Gaza, and 60 percent of
these, according to the agency, were under 18 years of age. This
youthful element constitutes the core of Israel's security
problem. The youths foment riots; they lay ambushes for Israeli
patrols, and they commit dreadful collaborator killings, of which
more presently.
Practically all of the youths are unemployed because the
Rabin government in March 1993 closed off the territories from
Israel proper, preventing the Palestinians from journeying to
jobs there. Before the Gulf War, in 1990, 80,000 Palestinians
commuted to work in Israel.6 Then, through restrictions imposed
by successive Israeli governments, the number dropped to 35,000;
and, after the closure, it fell to zero. The number of
Palestinians working in Israel has now begun to creep up again.
Effectively this means that the youths of Gaza have nothing
to do. When they are under strict curfew, they cannot even leave
their homes. They, and their families, subsist on relief from the
United Nations. Prior to 1990, they could also count on
remittances from relatives working in the Persian Gulf. Now,
however, the number of Palestinians in the Gulf has fallen to
practically nothing, so that source of aid has disappeared. There
is plenty of food in Gaza (and on the West Bank) because
Palestine is a rich agricultural region. Unfortunately, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to market area produce
commercially. Previously, the Saudis and Kuwaitis were major
purchasers, but here again, because of the Gulf War (and
complications we will go into below), that no longer obtains. The
loss of income, the desperate crowding; these things are bad,
certainly. But more disturbing to the Palestinians is the threat
of expulsion. They are continually having to confront the
prospect of one day being dispossessed. Since 1990, the number of
Jewish settlers coming into Gaza and the West Bank has risen
sharply. According to one Israeli commentator, after 20 years of
occupation, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have essentially been
annexed, as a result of settlement drives initiated by the
Israeli government.7 The number of Jews living outside the
so-called Green Line (the line dividing the occupied territories

from Israel proper) is now about 100,000 and climbing steadily.
The settlers not only appropriate the land of Gaza and the
West Bank (not to mention East Jerusalem), they seek to take over
the scarce water resources. In Gaza, the water table has been
badly exploited; water has become briney and predictions are that
by the year 2000 there will not be enough to sustain the
population, Arab and Jewish.8
The contrast between Gaza Town and the camps (that is, the
Arab section) and the areas reserved for the Jews is striking.
There are an estimated 5,000 Jewish settlers in the Strip, most
of whom live in the southern half, the so-called Gush Qatif
sector (see Figure 2).9 Here there are white beaches, rolling
sand dunes, and vast empty spaces (Gush Qatif resembles the
Pacific coast around Monterey, California). It is heavily
patrolled by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) units. Whenever the
settlers wish to travel, they do so escorted by the IDF, usually
a jeep forward, and one behind. At least one of the Israeli
settlements is ringed with an electrified barbed wire fence, the
rest with razor wire.
This protection is essential, given the high incidence of
violence. Arab children routinely stone the settlers' cars, and
there have been ambushes laid with firearms.10 Activity of this
sort is probably to be expected. However, there is violence of
another kind, more difficult to fathom--that of Palestinians
against themselves. Each day, it seems, Palestinians kill their
own; if they do not kill them, they may maim them.11 Knifings
predominate, although there are some shootings; knee cappings are
common.
The Israelis tend to lump all such actions under the heading
of "collaborator" incidents. They claim that they are carried out
by groups, like Hamas, bent on eliminating sympathizers of the
occupation. Some western aid workers in the territories dispute
this however, convinced that many of the outrages are, in fact,
crimes with no politics connected to them.12 In a situation where
no law and order exists, people take advantage of the fact to
harm each other. Be this as it may, conditions inside the
territories--and particularly this is the case in Gaza--are truly
Hobbesian, as will be brought out in greater detail below.13
One of the goals of the study will be to investigate how
these dreadful conditions came to be. For a long time the
Palestinians under the occupation seemed content. Their mood
changed, however, with the outbreak of the intifadah.
Intifadah.
Hamas is a product of the intifadah, that eruption of
popular feeling that occurred in the territories on December 9,
1987, and which is going on to this day. Prior to the outbreak,

Hamas did not exist. It grew directly from the revolt, and was
only able to make itself felt as a political force because of it.
If we are to understand Hamas, we must know something about the
intifadah.
The term intifadah, in Arabic, means "spasm" or "frisson," a
rather mild way of describing an event that has proved so bloody
and destructive.14 Arabs could have called the intifadah a
thawrah, or an inqilab. The first term means revolution, the
second, upheaval. Both are more serious than intifadah, which is
rather a dismissive term.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) first coined the
phrase intifadah. The PLO leadership in Tunis, caught off guard
by the riots, tended to downplay them, but then the leaders-realizing that something unusual was going on--decided an
intifadah had occurred.15 The Palestinian community, they said,
was going through a phase of violent convulsions. The implication
was that this would soon diminish.
In fact the PLO did not want a revolt in the territories;
tactically, in its eyes, it made no sense. Something like this
could only end in disaster; Israel was not about to tolerate an
uprising, and could quite easily put it down, or so it was felt
at the time. Along with this, the PLO had virtually no cadres
inside the occupied territories who were prepared to take charge
of such an event, much less direct it over a sustained period.
As for the Israelis, they too were surprised.16 The ferocity
of the affair stunned them. It began over an incident that was
relatively trivial. An Israeli truck driver rammed two cars
loaded with Arab laborers, four of whom died. The Israelis
claimed this was an accident; the Palestinian community saw it as
an act of willful mayhem. In their view, the driver deliberately
rammed the cars.
Demonstrations broke out, which the IDF put down. There, the
matter might have ended. However, the demonstrations re-erupted,
turning into full-scale riots which went on for days. The IDF
escalated its response; but quelling the riots was not something
that it could accomplish easily. Israel had relatively little
trouble with the territories previously. Not having had to deal
with serious riots, the IDF was not prepared to practice riot
control; it had little riot gear, and few units trained in coping
with determined rioters.17 Many IDF units came under intense
pressure. They had live ammunition to defend themselves, but had
been ordered not to use it. However, as pressures mounted, they
did use it, and a number of Palestinians were killed.
This inflamed the passions of the Palestinians yet further.
More units were challenged, and more killings occurred. In this
way the intifadah gathered strength. Rage on the part of the
Gazans produced the initial escalation; the unsure handling of
the IDF aggravated conditions to the point of lost control. The

question is why, after such a long period in which the
Palestinians had seemed docile, did they revolt in this way? Why
did this come in December 1987? It is impossible to say
definitely, but a number of factors clearly were influential.
The Likud Factor.
One of the biggest influences on the intifadah would appear
to have been the takeover of the government in Israel by the
Likud Party. Whereas Likud's successor, the party of Labor-particularly its leader Shimon Peres--tended to be conciliatory
toward the Palestinians, most Likud politicians were hawks. The
most committed hawk was Housing and Development Minister Ariel
Sharon. Sharon advocated settling as many Jews as possible in the
occupied territories, even if this meant displacing Palestinians,
a violation of international law. Under the terms of the Geneva
Convention an occupying power cannot radically alter arrangements
in territories it has seized.
Many Jews contend that the Geneva Convention does not apply
to the occupied territories.18 They argue that Jews are perfectly
free to settle there, and, moreover, that God has given this land
to the Jewish people. This argument, based on religious
principles, has had an unforeseen (and unfortunate) sequel, as we
shall see.
Sharon did not merely hold these views, he sought to
implement them through an ambitious settlement program. To be
sure, at the time few Jews wished to live in the territories.
However many zealots did. They were members of groups like Gush
Emunim and Kach, and Kahane Hay. Individuals who belonged to such
organizations were involved in the Hebron massacre, and Rabin has
described them as Jewish "terrorists." The individuals think of
themselves as settlers; to the Palestinians they are
paramilitarists.
As may be imagined, the upsurge in Israeli ultranationalism upset the Palestinians. Prior to the mid-1980s, when
most of the agitation commenced, the territories were peaceful,
or at least relatively so. Indeed, the Israelis looked on them as
a buffer, a shield against hostile elements on their borders.19
Going beyond that, the Israelis had discovered a pool of cheap
labor in the Palestinian community.20
The Palestinians possessed significant job skills. They had
a long tradition as artisans, and their schooling was excellent,
thanks to UNRWA. They were not disposed towards unions, there
being no dearth of other Palestinians waiting to take their
places should they be fired.
Given all of this, few Israelis wanted to disturb
arrangements beyond the Green Line. The advent to power of the
Likud Party changed this, however; Palestinians began to fear a

fundamental policy change was taking shape, one spearheaded by
Israel's religious establishment. Many religious leaders in
Israel are firm upholders of the concept of greater Israel.21
Defeat for the PLO.
Something else troubled the Palestinians during this period-the outcome of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The invasion
was undertaken to drive the PLO from bases on the
Lebanese-Israeli border, and, although costly to Israel in terms
of lives, it largely succeeded. The PLO was driven off, not only
from the border, but out of Lebanon to Tunis, across the
Mediterranean.
As a consequence, the PLO lost its military option,
seriously compromising its credibility. The loss became quickly
apparent when the Arab Summit convened in Amman, Jordan, in 1987.
The Palestinian problem was virtually sidelined.22 Whereas in
previous years Palestine had dominated the agendas of the Arab
heads of state, in 1987 the Iran-Iraq War became the focus.
Palestinians were shocked to find themselves ignored, if not
abandoned.
Difficult Times in the Gulf.
And finally there was the economic factor--after years of
prosperity in the Gulf, the price of oil, in the mid-1980s,
dropped precipitously. This immediately affected the fortunes of
the Palestinians, inasmuch as their economy depended--along with
jobs in Israel--on regular receipt of remittances from family
members working in the sheikhdoms. Indeed, under a plan
previously worked out by the PLO, the salaries of expatriate
Palestinians were taxed by the Gulf monarchs, and the revenues
deposited directly into the PLO's coffers.23 This tithing
continued in the mid-1980s, but, as there were fewer Palestinians
working in the Gulf, proceeds decreased.
Al Jihad.
All of these are what might be called macro-factors
affecting the mood of the Palestinians prior to the intifadah,
which disposed them toward violence. Another, more prosaic, event
also seems to have touched the population, at street level, as it
were.
In August 1987, six Palestinians escaped from Israel's Ansar
II prison in the Gaza Strip. The Israelis assumed the escapees
had slipped over the border into Egypt, but subsequently, masked
gunmen killed an Israeli officer in a daring daylight attack.
Later the IDF announced that the killers themselves had died in
an exchange of gunfire with Israeli security forces. Among the
dead was one of the escapees. He had not fled to Egypt, but had
gone underground to await an opportunity to shoot the officer,

who, it subsequently was brought out, was the chief interrogator
at Ansar.24
Many Palestinians were thrilled by this incident. After a
depressing string of setbacks, here was a certain morale booster.
The community held a massive funeral, attended by thousands of
mourners. Two points are important about this: first, the
incident exerted great appeal on youth (this was evident from
their behavior at the funeral); and second, it related to
religious support for the intifadah. The original Ansar escapees
were all jihadists, members of a movement that played a
significant role in the uprising.
For some time individuals who proclaimed themselves to be
jihadists had been operating in the territories.25 These men were
unique, in that practically without exception they were former
inmates of Israeli jails. They had adopted an extremist position
toward the occupation, looking on it as an abomination which they
were bound to oppose on religious grounds. No hope lay in the
Arab leadership which, they felt, was irredeemably corrupt.
Moreover, the Prophet had enjoined Muslims to act independently,
as could be seen from reading the Koran.26 To be sure, revolt
seemed hopeless, given the power of the Israeli state, but
Muslims must accept martyrdom; the religion was nourished on the
blood of martyrs.
The jihadists were among Israel's most stubborn foes,
largely because of their desperate situation. A Palestinian who
had served time in an Israeli jail faced a bleak future. The
Israeli government issued special identity cards, noting the
holder's prison status.27 An ex-convict could not be employed, and
since few Palestinians emigrated in the 1980s, such individuals
were seriously compromised. Having not much to look forward to,
many ex-convicts embraced a movement built on despair. When the
intifadah erupted, members of the jihad movement came quickly to
the fore. In the initial stages they virtually led it; whenever
it appeared set to expire, they, by their wild exhortations,
whipped it to life again.
At the same time, however, for the intifadah to turn into a
full-scale revolt something more was needed, namely a means of
sustaining it past the initial enthusiastic phase; an ideological
justification was required to continue the uprising. The
jihadists certainly were ideological, but, being a minuscule
group, they lacked authority. We now see one of the most
respected religious groups in the Middle East enter the struggle.
This was the Muslim Brotherhood, the progenitor of Hamas.
The Brotherhood.
Hamas did not really become active in the intifadah until
August 1988, eight months after the trouble had begun.28 Prior to
that, unknown individuals, calling themselves Hamas members,

distributed leaflets urging this or that action in the name of
the intifadah. However, before the eruption and immediately
afterward, except for the aforementioned leaflets, no one had
heard of Hamas, nor knew what it stood for.
Hamas was a spinoff from the Society of Muslim Brothers,
traditional Islamic organization well-known and powerful
throughout the Middle East. The society sprang up in Egypt in
1920s to fight the British occupation there.29 The Brotherhood
staunchly conservative, and, as might be expected, hostile to
communism. This inevitably brought it into conflict with the
regime of Egypt's first republican ruler, Gamal Abdel Nasser,
made Egypt a client of the Soviet Union. Nasser purged the
society in 1954, jailing thousands of its members and sending
thousands more into flight overseas.
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Having been driven into exile, many Brothers went to the
Gulf where they forged close ties to the oil sheikhs (and where,
thanks to these associations, many amassed fortunes). Eventually,
the society migrated to Jordan and Syria. However, in Syria it
ran afoul of local Ba'thists who purged it, perhaps more
ruthlessly than Nasser.30 As a consequence the Brotherhood's base
became Jordan, where its conservative stance complemented the
royal rule of the Hashemites.31
As already noted, prior to the 1967 war, the West Bank was
part of Jordan, and King Hussein cherished the hope that it might
one day be returned to him. His hopes were dashed, however, when,
at the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974, Arab heads of state decreed
the PLO to be the official representative of the Palestinians;
any land returned to Arab control would be administered by it.
King Hussein was forced to forego his claim. He did so publicly,
but in fact continued to be involved with the territories, and
the Brotherhood was a part of this.32
The Brotherhood established a religious center in Gaza, the
al Mujamma'a al Islamiya
, from which it conducted a number of
charitable functions.33 It ran hospitals and schools and
appropriated funds for the establishment of mosques. It paid the
salaries of imams (the equivilent under Islam of Christian
priests) to serve in these mosques. The Israelis permitted this,
apparently in the belief that, because of its conservatism, the
Brotherhood was not a threat to them. To be sure, the
Brotherhood, in its propaganda, opposed Zionism and Western
imperialism (like Khomeiniism, which did not develop until 1979,
the Brotherhood looked on both the Soviets and the West as
enemies of Muslims); however, it also foreswore violence. Having
been purged in Egypt and Syria, it avoided premature revolt.
Muslims must first make themselves strong in the faith, the
Brothers believed, and, then, when conditions were ripe, they
could act militarily.34 This was a line that the Israelis could
accommodate, and so they did not object to the Brotherhoodsponsored activity.

Then, in 1987, the intifadah erupted, which gave the
Brotherhood an opportunity to assert itself. The PLO, as we said,
was caught off guard by the revolt, and thus not prepared to deal
with it. The Brotherhood was not affected this way because-unlike the PLO cadres, who were underground--the religious forces
operated in the open and had numerous agencies they could convert
to action groups. At the same time, however, the traditionally
cautious society was not anxious to get involved in an armed
revolt.
In the end, the society adopted a somewhat devious stance.
It created a new organization, Hamas, which quickly entered the
fray. Interestingly, however, Hamas made no attempt to conceal
its ties to the larger organization. When, in August 1988, it
issued a charter of its goals, Hamas identified itself as the
society's "military wing."35 This means that almost from the first
the Israeli government was aware that Hamas, and the Brotherhood,
were active participants in the revolt. Yet it took no action
against them. Why?
A Policy of Sowing Dissent.
It appears that the Israelis tolerated Hamas believing that
in this way they could harm the PLO. As mentioned above, the PLO
prior to the intifadah had no infrastructure in the territories
prepared to assume a leadership role.36 Once the intifadah
started, however, the PLO sought to make up for this. It began
contacting people, ordering them to perform this or that
activity, and--in carrying out the orders of Tunis--the PLO
cadres clashed with Hamas. These initial clashes seem to have
determined the Israelis' course of action, which was to pit Hamas
against the PLO for control of the intifadah. They let the two
vie, anticipating that, in the process, they would destroy each
other.37
Why did the two not join forces? To begin with, they served
different masters: Hamas was the client of the Brotherhood; the
PLO belonged to Yasir Arafat. But beyond that, they opposed each
other on ideological grounds. Hamas deplores the spread of
secularism in the Middle East, which it views as a Western plot
to undermine Islam. In addition Hamas rejects the idea of the
nation-state, as antithetical to the ummah (the worldwide
community of the faithful which existed in the days of the
Prophet Mohammad). The ummah, Hamas believes, is the bedrock of
Islam's greatness; once Muslims allowed the ummah to be broken
down into separate states Islam faced decline. Of course, the PLO
is a secularist organization, and its aim precisely is to create
a nation-state for the Palestinian people.
Thus the two organizations are basically at odds, and thus
the Israelis were persuaded to pursue their strategy, which
essentially was one of divide and conquer. But, in September
1989, the Israelis did an about face, and outlawed Hamas. Why the

sudden reversal?
Killing Collaborators.
In the beginning Hamas and the PLO behaved as the Israelis
hoped that they would--they fought each other, fiercely. Indeed,
the fight was not restricted to these two factions only. All of
the groups in the territories, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Communists, the original
jihadists--all took up arms against each other.38
Moreover, apparently encouraged by Hamas, elements from
within the community began meting out vigilante justice against
other community members. For example, persons alleged to be drug
traffickers and individuals accused of sexual crimes were
killed.39
It was impossible to stop this sort of thing, because, with
the outbreak of the intifadah, the whole judicial and security
apparatus in the territories collapsed. Palestinians who had
previously worked as police in the territories quit en masse.40
Palestinian lawyers, too, had struck, refusing to try cases in
the Israeli courts. The Israelis might have appointed new
officials, however they did not do so. For a time they let
matters drift, until something happened, which to them must have
been truly alarming.
Radicals began attacking alleged collaborators.41 Early in
the occupation the Israeli authorities set up so-called Village
Leagues, ostensibly to help administer the territories; this, the
Israelis said, was a form of self-rule. In fact, the Leagues
functioned more or less as paramilitary forces, assisting the IDF
in its policing. Alongside the Leagues, the Israelis developed
informants, who kept them abreast of what was going on in the
territories. This made sense, from a security stand point-enabling the Israelis to control the territories without being
heavy handed. With a disaffected population, it does not do to
maintain a high profile; better to stay out of troubled areas and
only intervene in force in emergencies.
The radicals were now silencing the individuals who supplied
the Israelis with their information. This, of course, raised the
stakes immensely for the occupation authorities; without a
constant stream of informed communication from inside the
territories, they could not keep control. Dreadful situations
began to develop. For example, in one instance radicals took over
a village, convened a kangaroo court in the town square, passed
sentence on an alleged collaborator and killed him-- without the
Israelis ever knowing.42 That this sort of thing could occur was
outrageous.
Clearly the Israelis had to act, and yet action entailed
sacrifice. For the Israelis to change policy, and go into the

territories in force, would incur financial and psychological
costs. The Israelis had only just recovered from Lebanon; they
did not want more casualties. A policy of direct control would
practically ensure that such casualties would occur.
The author believes that the Israelis' decision to outlaw
Hamas ultimately was determined by events outside the
territories, in the international arena. Something unforeseen had
occurred in 1988 that the Israelis did not like. The Iraqis had
beaten the Iranians in the 8-year long Iran-Iraq War.
One of the features of that war was the solid support Iraq
received from Jordan's King Hussein. Now, Jordan stood to benefit
from its steadfastness. There was talk of Iraq and Jordan forming
a union, raising the possibility of Iraqi interference in the
territories through Amman.43
Whatever motivated the Israelis, in September 1989 they
outlawed Hamas, and indeed changed their whole occupation policy.
Until this point, the Israelis' handling of the intifadah was, in
the author's view, fairly astute. They had made some mistakes
early on in the trouble, but exhibited an admirable recovery
capability. However, as we moved into 1990, we saw them begin to
lose control; they no longer appeared as confident. Events simply
overtook them.
1990 and All That.
1990 was rife with setbacks for the Palestinians. First, the
Soviet Union collapsed; this development clearly had an impact.
We said earlier that Housing Minister Sharon's settlement policy
suffered from lack of available immigrants. Suddenly in 1990 a
mass of these appeared--literally hundreds of thousands of Soviet
Jews were applying to leave Russia. In the eyes of many Israelis,
the natural destination of these people was the Jewish state, and
so plans began to be formulated to receive them.
Also in 1990, Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, an
extraordinarily misconceived operation which, among other things,
compromised the Palestinians. By supporting Saddam, they
alienated their major financial backers, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In the eyes of many western observers, this action on the
Palestinians' part was foolish; however, there were extenuating
circumstances for what they did.
For example, Saddam, in an attempt to extricate himself from
Kuwait, offered to withdraw if the United States would take up
the Palestine problem in the U.N. Then-President Bush refused,
but did pledge to act on the matter once the crisis was resolved.
The Palestinians were grateful for support from the Iraqi leader,
and believed he was concerned for their interests. Further, once
the war started, Saddam launched Scud missiles against Israel,
and the Palestinians--even though they lived in the same target

area--applauded the attacks. Nonetheless, whatever emotional
satisfaction the Palestinians might have gained from the
invasion, practically it was a terrible blow for them.
Not only did the PLO suffer, but the religious forces as
well. Initially, when Saddam went into Kuwait, the Brotherhood
and Hamas condemned him. But then, when Saudi Arabia's King Fahd
invited the U.N. forces into the Saudi peninsula, many pious
Muslims around the world recoiled in horror.44 The peninsula is
supposedly haram (forbidden) to unbelievers. Confusion developed
among the religious groups as they tried to sort out their
sympathies. In the end, significant elements of both the
Brotherhood and Hamas supported Saddam.45
All in all, the Palestinians--secular and religious-suffered because of events of 1990. However, they did recoup in
one department. An event occurred that worked against the
Israelis--the so-called al Haram al Sharif incident.

Al Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem is the site of Al Aqsa
Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam, the place from which
the Prophet is believed to have ascended to heaven. In October
1990 a Jewish group called The Temple Mount Faithful announced
that it would "lay a cornerstone" in the mosque area.46 The
organization had called for the destruction of the mosque,
because it is built over the Third Temple, holy to Jews.
When Muslims rushed to Al Aqsa to defend it, Israeli troops
opened fire on them, killing 21. The United Nations ordered an
investigation, with which the Israelis refused to cooperate. They
initiated their own inquiry, which subsequently absolved the
police, or anyone connected with the government. Predictably the
Arabs saw this as a "whitewash."47 The Muslim community genuinely
feared for Al Aqsa, ever since a 1969 attempt had been made to
burn it down.48
The al Haram al Sharif incident boosted the status of Hamas
among the Palestinians. We said earlier that the PLO became
involved in the intifadah belatedly, and when it did it was not
to perpetuate the revolt but to defuse it. PLO leader Yasser
Arafat called for a "white" intifadah.49 He wanted the
Palestinians to practice civil disobedience--withhold their
taxes, stay home from work in the civil administration, that sort
of thing. Hamas disdained this course as cowardly.
Once the al Haram al Sharif crisis occurred, it appeared to
many Palestinians that Hamas, not the PLO, was pursuing the
proper course. Indeed, some groups inside the territories (and
the jihadists were foremost in this) called for an actual armed
insurrection.50 Until this point the intifadah had been waged with
rocks and burning tires and slingshots--but no firearms. The PLO
responded to this call with horror. "...our instructions (said
one PLO official) are not to use firearms, because we know to use
them is childish...Why should we give Shamir (the Israeli Prime

Minister) a chance to kill more of us ?"51
It is not important how the PLO responded, but how Israeli
officials took the appeal for an armed revolt. Their response, in
the words of one Israeli commander, was "to fight fire with
fire."52 They increased their patrolling of the territories, and,
along with that, debated changing the rules of engagement to
permit firing indiscriminately at the rioters. They also
announced a new policy of using "special undercover units."53 It
was not specified what tasks the units would perform, but implied
was that they would not be to the Palestinians' liking.
The incidence of demonstrations increased dramatically, as
the Palestinians confronted Israeli units with rock throwing
demonstrations.54 At the same time, however, the IDF was not
specifically targeted. To be sure, more IDF patrols were
assaulted, but then more patrols were entering the Palestinian
neighborhoods. It was the confrontational policy that fueled the
violence. One could conclude that the call for armed insurrection
by the Palestinians had merely been rhetoric.55
Then, in 1992 a border patrolman disappeared, kidnapped
according to the government. When this man's body was found,
Prime Minister Rabin blamed Hamas. He ordered the immediate
deportation of 418 individuals, whom he described as Hamas
operatives.56
Several weeks after the deportations, however, Israeli
security revealed there had been an error.57 Hamas was not
responsible for the "kidnapping"; rather four Palestinians (no
connection with Hamas) had run over the patrolman-- apparently on
impulse--after which they drove the body around the territories
until they dumped it. By labeling Hamas as the perpetrator of
this crime, the Israelis elevated the organization's status,
crediting it with an operation that it did not perform.
Actions like the deportations aggravated misgivings being
felt throughout the Palestinian community. After the Kuwait
affair, the United States made good its pledge to convoke a peace
conference. However, when Arafat agreed to attend, many
Palestinians faulted him.58 To take the step, he had had to
perform certain ameliorating acts--recognizing Israel, and
foreswearing violence. To many, this was toadying to the West.
Actually, Arafat did not have much choice. After Kuwait, the
Palestinians were virtually bereft of support in the
international community. The United States held out hope of
redress. For Arafat to have refused the offer would have been a
loss of opportunity for the Palestinians and possibly the end of
Arafat's control of the movement.
Thus we can argue that a combination of circumstances
promoted Hamas' cause. Arafat's moves to conciliate the West came
just as Israel was stepping up pressure on the Palestinians in

the territories. In particular the activity of the special
squads, mentioned earlier, provoked many. These units went about
the territories in disguise. When they spotted a suspected
terrorist, they executed him on the spot.59 Muslims who rejected
such treatment sought the path of armed resistence, which now had
practically been taken over by Hamas.
A western aid worker told the author that the Israelis, by
their heavy handedness, raised the paranoia level of the
Palestinians astronomically.60 The community was already strung to
a high pitch of tension. By the beginning of 1993, hostility
inside the territories toward the Israeli government had
surpassed all previous bounds.
The Reason for the Switch.
The Israelis' decision to intensify their repression seems
to have been dictated by several concerns. First, something had
to be done about the collaborator killings; these could not be
allowed to continue. Along with this went the problem of the
settlers living inside the territories. They were pressuring the
government for protection, and some, on their own, had begun
attacking the Palestinians. Indeed, there appeared to be a
correlation between the opening of peace talks in Madrid and the
rise in anti-Arab violence by the settlers.61
And finally there was concern over the future of Soviet
Jewish immigration. Once Moscow allowed Jews to immigrate, it
became a matter of some urgency to end the intifadah. The Israeli
government feared that the rioting would keep the Russians away.
The repression must be seen, then, as an attempt to end the
intifadah by any means necessary, and the mass deportations of
alleged Hamas members was an aspect of this. This was a way of
destroying the infrastructure that the Israelis believed made the
revolt possible. The Israelis wanted to strip the territories of
potential leaders, by rounding up as many adults as possible.62
The repression, however, had unfortunate consequences, of a sort
that the Israelis probably could not have foreseen. In the
absence of adult leaders, Palestinian children took over the
intifadah, and, in the process, transformed it into what it is
today.
The Situation Today.
Before the announcement of the Declaration of Principles-the agreement between Rabin and Arafat to commence formal peace
talks--a visitor to Gaza would encounter IDF personnel
everywhere. They patrolled in jeeps, the windshields covered with
wiremesh to protect against missiles. IDF units stood along the
main thoroughfares, conducting security checks. Soldiers were
posted on the roofs, observing the streets. At certain
intersections they had erected watch towers, from which they

trained machine guns on passing vehicles.
The IDF inspected everyone. It was impressive how many
roadblocks there were. Some were quite substantial, huge blocks
of stone set down in the road. Others clearly had been set up
sporadically, to catch people by surprise. Most unexpectedly, the
IDF stopped U.N. cars, even though these were clearly marked.
This restless, constant search activity was mandated by the
repression. One assumed that with so much security violence would
be reduced. This, however, has not been the case. Violence
continues, mostly in the form of rock-throwing attacks. A western
aid worker told the author, "The rock attacks are like summer
storms. One minute the street is calm. Then, zut, rocks!
Everywhere rocks, and you must flee. Then, zut, it's over. In a
minute it's passed." The rock attacks are the work of children,
some as young as 8 or 9 years. Some may be older, in their late
teens, but certainly not much older than that.
Children always have been involved in the intifadah, but not
until recently have they taken charge. We can see this from
statistics, a steady lowering of the age of individuals arrested
for intifadah-related crimes. This appears to have come about in
connection with Israel's repressive arrest policy. In December
1992, the chief of staff of the IDF, Lt. Gen. Ehud Baraq,
revealed that 100,000 Palestinians had been detained since the
start of the intifadah. With something like this occurring, only
children would be left to lead the movement.63
Some argue that children do not control things, but rather
adults operating undercover are the actual leaders. This does not
seem possible. To be sure, adults headquartered outside the
territories, in Jerusalem, Amman or in Tunis, issue communiques
on behalf of the intifadah. However, it is unlikely they
supervise events. The hold of the IDF over the territories is
much too tight for that; it would be impossible for anyone, based
outside the area, to calibrate events inside it.64
In 1989, an Israeli commentator speculated as to how the
intifadah was structured.65 A so-called parlor leadership existed
(he said), which resided inside the Green Line. Comprising
well-known figures, this leadership spoke in the name of the
intifadah, and--at the time--actually did control things. The
parlor leaders, known for their long service to the cause, were
respected, and, as a consequence, could command obedience. Under
them, a second echelon of leaders inside the territories operated
underground. And below them, a third echelon of "street leaders,"
comprising thousands of youths, led the riots, performed acts of
sabotage against the occupation authorities, and, in effect, were
the foot soldiers of the intifadah.
The author believes that the second echelon has now
disappeared, wiped out by the IDF arrest campaign. This leaves
the movement essentially in disarray. The crucial link between

the leadership and the cadres has been severed, and now the
cadres are virtually on their own.66 In other words, the erstwhile
discipline has gone out of the movement, that discipline which
was supplied by mature adults.
This would explain some of the more dismaying developments
that have occurred in the intifadah recently. For example, many
disreputable practices have surfaced, such as instances of
merchants being shaken down by the youths and young women
subjected to sexual attacks. (This latter situation is
extraordinary in a predominantly Muslim society.) It is, of
course, difficult to determine the authenticity of such
allegations, but certainly much is occurring that has nothing to
do with the intifadah, i.e., advancing the cause.
In fact, one could argue that the character of the intifadah
has changed, until today it is no longer a political movement, in
the sense that it is attempting to realize a specifically
political agenda.67 Political activity is carried on by groups in
planned, coordinated fashion; very little of what is going on in
the territories today is like this. There is nothing planned or
deliberate about the rock throwing. This is mere rioting; indeed,
it is a form of mob violence.
Very well, if all of this is mob activity, merely, why has
the intifadah persisted for so long? One would think that, for
the intifadah to sustain itself, it would need a strong, tightly
controlled organization. In the author's view the intifadah goes
on because of conditions inside the Strip. For example, there
seems to be a correlation between heightened violence and the
imposition of curfews. When rigorous curfews are imposed, the
level of violence escalates. Conditions, which are bad, then
become intolerable, with increased violence the inevitable
result. There is also the factor of settler harassment.68 The
Hebron massacre was carried out by an extremist Jew connected to
one of the settler groups. The Palestinians believe the massacre
was a deliberate act of provocation, and they feel themselves to
be in danger of such attacks constantly. Therefore the community
must be prepared to defend itself whenever an attack appears
imminent.69 At the slightest rumor of trouble, the community turns
out into the streets.
If the intifadah is more or less out of control, can it be
at all effective? In a perverse way it does seem to be so. It has
caused the Israelis to expend considerable resources, both human
and material. It was estimated that, prior to the Declaration of
Principles, 5,000 IDF troops stood guard in the Strip. This is
one soldier for every settler (assuming that there are, in fact,
5,000 settlers; the United Nations believes that the settler
population in Gaza is much smaller than this). Besides personnel,
the IDF had a considerable investment in technology dedicated to
the intifadah. Tanks, jeeps, helicopters, various intelligence
devices--all had to be maintained. Now that the Declaration has
been signed, the Israelis have been able to withdraw some of

their units. However, the IDF has not completely withdrawn. Units
remain to guard the Jewish settlements, so expenses continue to
be borne.
All this is a great drain on the Israelis, one they are hard
put to keep up. 70 Therefore they have had to look for some other
way of operating--apparently this is what the Declaration of
Principles is about. Rabin and Peres want the PLO to do the job
for them, i.e., use Palestinians to police Palestinians.71 The PLO
has agreed to this, apparently in the belief that since the
Israelis are in need they will be prepared to make concessions.
To be sure, Rabin and Peres (who made this deal) do not
speak for the whole of Israel. The Likud Party is very much
against sharing power with the PLO. However, Likud is not the
main source of worry here; it is Hamas, and the religious forces.
Just recently Hamas killed 23 Israelis using a suicide bomber who
struck inside Tel Aviv. What was the organization aiming for with
this strike? We will postpone speculation on this matter until
after we have discussed Hizbollah.
Hizbollah.
Hizbollah is a product of the Lebanese Civil War and the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon which followed it.72 It is beyond the
scope of this study to recapitulate the history of Lebanon's
recent troubles. However, to understand Hizbollah something of
this background must be understood. We will provide an overview
of occurrences during the period, at least as they affected the
Shias, the community from which Hizbollah has sprung.
Lebanon's Sectarian Struggle.
Lebanon is a country of sects, each traditionally occupying
its own discrete area (see Figure 3). The Shias are a sect along
with the rest, and their principal territory is located in the
south adjacent to the Israeli border.73
From 1975 until 1982, Lebanon was engulfed in a civil war in
which all of the sects fought each other--the Maronite
Christians, the Druze, the Sunnis, the Palestinians, even the
Shias, although the Shias, initially at least, were the least
involved.
Prior to 1982, Lebanon's Shias were the most politically
backward group in the country. Partly this was due to their being
repressed by their leaders, wealthy landowners and clerics
uninterested in raising the political consciousness of the
masses. Moreover, the Shias were oppressed by the Palestinians.
In 1970 the PLO was driven out of Jordan and settled in southern
Lebanon in the Shias' area.74 It chose this region because from
there it could conduct raids--which Lebanon's weak government was
powerless to curtail--on Israel's northern settlements.

In 1982 the Israelis decided to end the depredations by
invading the Palestinians' southern enclave. Operation Peace for
Galilee had as its declared goal to push the Palestinians 40
kilometers away from the Lebanese border. Thus they would not be
able to shell Israeli settlements and would find it hard to carry
on their cross border raids. The incursion of Israeli forces was
headed by Ariel Sharon, the same Sharon, who, as Housing
Minister, later reshaped Israel's settlement policy. At the time,

he was Defense Minister of Israel under the Likud Party.

According to Robert Fisk, author of Pity the Poor Nation,
Sharon had a hidden agenda. He sought not only to push the
Palestinians from the border area, but to alienate Lebanon from
rest of the Arab states.75 Lebanon was at this time (and indeed
remains today) a member of the Arab League and an enemy of
Israel. However, Sharon aimed to exploit discontents within the
dominant Maronite Christian community. The Maronites had close
ties to the West, particularly to France and the United States.
They hated the Palestinians, whom they wished to see driven from
their midst. In Sharon's mind, the Christians were natural allies
of Israel.76 Tel Aviv would undergird the Maronites' power
position in Lebanon; in return, they would take Lebanon out of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Thus Sharon planned to invade Lebanon on the pretext of
cleansing the border of guerrillas, but, then, continuing to
Beirut, invest the capital and strike a deal with the Maronite
president of Lebanon whereby he would conclude a separate peace
with Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from the country.77
The plan was flawed in a key area--Syria has traditionally
considered Lebanon part of its sphere of influence, and, once it
perceived what Sharon was up to, it mobilized to block the
invasion. The Syrian army was outclassed by the IDF; however it
did slow the momentum of the advance, and, as a consequence,
Operation Galilee bogged down.78 Sharon's forces found themselves
outside Beirut in a standoff with the Syrians, and a ragtag army
of guerrillas, including the PLO.
Since the IDF did not want to engage the Arab Muslim forces
hand-to-hand inside the ghetto areas of the city, and since the
Maronite Christians would not undertake to do this for them, a
way out had to be found. This was supplied by U.S. President
Reagan, who, in effect, offered to broker a withdrawal of the
Israeli forces.79
Reagan agreed to dispatch U.S. troops as part of a
Multi-National Force (MNF). The MNF interposed itself between the
warring Israelis and Syrians. Then an American envoy began
shuttle diplomacy between Tel Aviv and Damascus, attempting the
removal, not only of the Israelis from Lebanon, but of the
Syrians and PLO as well.
Those negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult, and, as a
consequence, the MNF could not pull out of Lebanon as planned.
When the forces were finally withdrawn, they were immediately
brought back after Lebanon's president was assassinated. After
this return the MNF came under attack, from--of all groups--the
Shias. They bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in south Beirut,
killing 241 U.S. servicemen. They committed many other outrages,
but this was the most infamous.80
The atrocity astonished U.S. policymakers, because (as noted

above) heretofore the Shias had been the most docile, tractable
people in Lebanon, if not the Middle East. What had brought about
this change?
Growth of a Movement.
To comprehend the change that overcame the Shias one must go
back to the early 1970s, when disruptive influences first began
to impinge upon them. The Shias' backward condition, as stated,
was a function of corrupt leadership. However, in the 1970s, a
Lebanese Shia cleric, Musa as Sadr, formed a movement, Harakat al
Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived). This, he proclaimed, would
uplift the Shias, making them into a politically significant
force.81
Sadr was a naturalized Lebanese, born in Iran. A man with a
shrewd political sense, he attacked the sectarian basis of
Lebanese government, which he found to be incompatible with
democracy. Under confessionalism (Lebanon's system of rule),
leadership positions and jobs are proportioned on a quota system.
Each sect gets so many jobs, supposedly based on its actual
numbers in the community.
Sadr claimed that the Shias, the largest sect in Lebanon,
consistently received the fewest patronage spots,82 and this, he
said, was a function of their low economic status. Sadr called
for an end to confessionalism--let Lebanese officials be elected,
as in a true democracy; let real political parties form, instead
of personality cliques around local warlords.
This call of Sadr's resonated widely in Lebanon, and
attracted many followers. By 1975--when the Civil War commenced-the Harakat had begun to be a significant social force. In part
this was due to the message Sadr was promoting, but along with
this he had launched a program of social welfare, administering
to the needs of the southerners.83 And then, in 1978, he
disappeared after a visit to Libya. His followers believe--to
this day--that Libya's Muamar Gadhafi had him murdered.
Nabih Berri and Amal.
The movement to empower the Shias might have perished with
Sadr had it not been for another individual, Nabih Berri. Berri
led the Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (better known by its
acronym Amal). Basically this was a militia formed during the
period of communal warfare, when the Shias needed a fighting arm
to survive.
When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Amal was just in the
process of growing and developing. Probably the mass of the Shias
welcomed the invasion. It was a way, they felt, of getting rid of
the Palestinians. Berri, however, called on his people to
resist.84 He had a number of reasons for this. For one, he was

then (and remains to this day) a strong Lebanese nationalist. He
believed the Shias' future was tied to Lebanon, and hence, to
him, the invasion was an unacceptable breach of Lebanon's
sovereignty.
Along with this, however, Berri had--prior to the invasion-become a client of Syria's President Hafez Assad. In those days,
every militia in Lebanon was either pro- or anti- Syria, a
requirement since Damascus continually intrigued in the Civil
War.
Unexpectedly, Berri's stand on the invasion proved prescient
because Sharon alienated the Shia sect. The Israeli did this by
forming ties to various Christian communities, who populated the
south along with the Shias.85 The Shias suspected Sharon aimed to
turn the Christians into Israeli surrogates, and let them take
over the administration of the predominantly Shia territory.
Having just gotten rid of the Palestinians, this was not a move
the Shias could support. As the Shias turned more and more
against Israel, Berri's Amal movement attracted more and more
recruits.
Berri might have become the foremost power broker in
Lebanon, had it not been for a totally unexpected development-abruptly, without warning, Iran decided to play in the Lebanese
arena.
Iran.
To this day it is not clear why Iran decided to enter
Lebanon.86 It did so, however, and this had a great impact on the
Amal movement. The Iranians are Shias, as are the followers of
Berri. However, the ideologies of the two movements--Khomeiniism
and Amal--could not have been further apart. Khomeini stood for a
regional Islamic revolt; Berri's Amal for working within the
Lebanese system. Iran wanted to mobilize the Lebanese Shias to
fight the United States. Berri vehemently opposed any such move
as ruinous.
As long as Amal remained opposed, Iran's strategy in Lebanon
was hamstrung. However the clerics got around this by forming a
movement of their own, Hizbollah (the Party of God). Initially,
they attracted mainly devout Shias, inspired by Khomeini's
revolution. In time, however, members of Amal switched to
Hizbollah, lured by the Iranians' subventions. This, naturally,
deepened the hostility between the groups,87 until ultimately they
came to blows, each trying to eliminate the other. For a time,
the fight was carried on in the area around Beirut. However,
actions taken by Israel caused the battle to shift to the south.
In retreating to the south, the Israelis had repeated a
pattern of previous years. Their 1982 invasion actually was the
second time they had entered Lebanon. In 1978, they conducted a

similar operation, on a smaller scale. After that affair, the
United Nations stationed observers throughout the southern
region. Even so, the Israelis did not entirely withdraw. They
maintained IDF units between the Litani River and Lebanese
border, and these cooperated with the aforementioned Christian
communities. (See Figure 4). Now, in 1982, they not only expanded
their area of control in Lebanon, they institutionalized it,
announcing that this was their "security zone." In addition they
formalized their association with the Christians by creating the
so-called South Lebanese Army (SLA). All of this was a great blow
to the Shias, who saw their homeland becoming the permanent fief
of the Christians. Clearly, some action had to be taken. But
what? Berri would not go to war with Israel. This was Hizbollah's
crusade, and, by joining it, Amal would become subservient
(however indirectly) to the Iranian clerics.
For awhile Berri enjoyed support for his nonaggression stand
from Syria. Damascus had gained by forcing Israel out of Beirut,
but it had to consolidate its position in the north. Assad did
not want the Israelis reinvading the south, as that could force a
resource-draining confrontation. Nonetheless, conditions were
deteriorating at an alarming rate all over Lebanon. The
intra-communal fighting was clearly out of hand. (As one observer
remarked, civil wars were erupting inside of civil wars.) There
had to be an attempt to reimpose authority.
Damascus, then, brokered the so-called Greater Beirut scheme
whereby the various militias would call off their vendettas in
return for guarantees from the Syrian government.88 In regard to
the Shias, Assad importuned Berri and the Hizbollahis to, in
effect, divide up their territory; Berri got control of southern
Beirut, while Hizbollah withdrew to the far south, there to take
up arms against Israel.
This occurred in 1989, and it is from this date that
Israel's war in the south derives. Berri's forces were now
effectively out of action. Hizbollah, however, virtually took
over the south to carry on the fight against the SLA and Israel.
The Shias and The Peace Process.
Assad has a reputation for being one of the shrewdest
politicians in the Middle East. In the present instance, he was
not only shrewd but lucky. In 1991, two years after he had
"unleashed" Hizbollah, the United States agreed to sponsor the
peace conference, as it had pledged to do at the outset of the
Kuwait crisis. Assad now saw that the situation in southern
Lebanon could benefit him, in relation to the role Syria might
play in the negotiations.
Assad went into the peace talks in a weak position. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, he had lost his principal patron.
In addition, the decision of Egypt to sign a separate peace with

Israel had taken away Syria's military option-- without Egypt,
Syria cannot possibly hope to fight the Jewish state.

To give himself leverage, Assad thought to make use of the
Shias. He had always viewed the creation of the security zone as
a mistake: once having taken the step, the Israelis had to defend
the area, regardless. By stepping up assistance to the

Hizbollahis, Syria could challenge Israel's hegemony in the
south. This would put the Israelis on notice that, to ensure
stability on their northern border, they must make concessions to
Syria in the negotiations.
Israel has so far refused to accede to Syria's strategy. It
has rather tried to defeat Hizbollah militarily. For every ambush
carried out by the group, Israel has retaliated with extreme
severity. For awhile it appeared that this counter-strategy would
be effective, but then, in 1993, the Hizbollahis began to show
surprising efficiency in their attacks. Moreover, they had been
equipped with extremely sophisticated weapons, with which they
took a high toll on both the IDF and SLA.
The Israelis then undertook their most devastating assault
on Lebanon since the 1982 war. In July 1993 they launched
Operation Accountability, in which they fired some 25,000 rounds
of artillery into southern Lebanon. They kept this up for seven
days, causing some 250,000 Shias to flee the south to Beirut
(with civilian casualties of 150 killed, over 500 wounded).89
In effect, the Israelis have opted for a policy of firmness,
the same strategy that they used in Gaza and on the West Bank. In
the author's view this is a mistake. Force does not work against
the radicals; excessive force is counterproductive.
We are now in a position to assess Hamas and Hizbollah. What
is it about the two groups that makes them so troublesome? Why is
it that policies that have proven successful in other, similar
circumstances, do not seem to work against them?
The Secret of the Radicals.
Israel meant Operation Accountability to teach the
Hizbollahis, and the Shia community, a lesson. By launching a
devastating military riposte it believed it could break the
community/radical tie.90
The strategy did not work. The Hizbollahis waited, and when
the IDF had pulled back across the border, they reinfiltrated the
zone. Within weeks they carried out another ambush, in which nine
IDF soldiers were killed.91 This was the most the Israelis had
lost in a single engagement since the 1982 invasion.
Significantly, the local community of Shias made no objection to
this; it did not condemn the Hizbollahis for taking the action
they did.
Israel should have seen that the local Shias are not a
factor in this equation. To be sure, many young Shias are allied
with Hizbollah. However, even if all the local youths were to
abandon Hizbollah, it could still carry on its war against
Israel.

Hizbollah is the only option available. After the end of the
Lebanese Civil War, the militias of all sects became inactive.
This means that large numbers of erstwhile militiamen no longer
have anything to do. Lebanon's economy has never recovered from
the devastation of the war; there are no jobs. It would be a rare
youth who would turn down Iranian pay for fighting the Israelis.
Thus, all that is required to keep the fight going is a core of
true believers (mujahadeen) to direct the conflict, and recruits
can be had in practically endless supply.
And so the situation has unfolded. The Hizbollahis have
mounted continuous ambushes, both against the IDF and SLA.
Periodically, the Israelis retaliate. But this does not resolve
anything, as the Hizbollahis soon attack again. It has so far
proven impossible to break the cycle of violence.
The ability of the Hizbollahis always to find recruits is
the secret of their power, and this goes for Hamas as well.
Conditions in the occupied territories feed revolt. Widespread
unemployment, general insecurity, enormous numbers of youths with
nothing remunerative to occupy them--these are factors that drive
desperate measures. The religious forces have seen the potential
of this situation and exploited it. They have brought the
struggle down to the street, turning it into a mass phenomenon,
where formerly--if anything--it was an elite affair.
That certainly is the way it was under the PLO. The PLO has
a leader, Arafat. He is surrounded by counselors who are all--as
he is--professional revolutionaries. These men give orders, which
they expect to be obeyed. The organizations of Hamas and
Hizbollah are not at all like this; they are much more loose.
Indeed there is very little hierarchical about either the
Hamas or the Hizbollah movements.92 The author was struck by how
many times he was told this while in the area. In Gaza
particularly, people would comment that Hamas has no bureaucracy,
and they would say this with obvious wonderment, as though this
were a fact of tremendous importance. Moreover, the implication
appeared to be that, not having one, meant that Hamas was not
corrupt.
If Hamas and Hizbollah have no structure (or at least none
that is very complex) how have they been able to achieve all that
they have? Ideology. They have formulated--in terms that the
youth can comprehend--a rationale for going on with the struggle.
The message of Hamas and Hizbollah is direct and compelling:
the armed struggle is everything, and everyone is in the
struggle. One makes the revolution by the simple expedient of
joining up, or (which amounts to the same thing) by taking the
gun.
The fundamental concept driving all of this is jihad, a
fertile idea, which few westerners seem capable of understanding.

Jihad--as the radicals construe it--is a way of personally
empowering oneself. The jihadists take the position that Muslims
are obliged to fight enemies of the faith, and they do it without
either the support or hindrance of a higher authority. In other
words, defending the faith is something that one does on one's
own authority.93
To this basic concept, the radicals have wedded a
corresponding idea of the ummah. The ummah is the worldwide
community of the faithful, which, the radicals say, is under
assault by the West. Thus the combined message of the radicals is
to defend the faith by preserving--and where possible--enlarging
the boundaries of the ummah.
Thus the youths who pour into the streets of Gaza and the
West Bank hurling rocks at IDF units could be said to be
performing jihad, because they are denying the Israelis access to
the ummah, or rather, to space claimed by the community of the
faithful. That space may be only a neighborhood, a quarter, a
qasbah, but it is Muslim ground, and as such sacred and worth
defending, even unto death.94
This seems a justified interpretation based on what is
occurring in the territories. We have discussed the rock-throwing
attacks, and described them as more or less spontaneous events.
There is something else going on that is more complicated, but
which seems to be of considerable importance; that is stabbings.
Next to rock-throwing attacks, stabbings comprise the largest
category of incidents in which the Palestinians engage.
Individual Palestinians perpetrate knife attacks on Israelis in
broad daylight, frequently making no attempt to defend
themselves--or even to flee--after the attack has been
performed.95 Western aid workers, on the spot, describe these
attacks as motivated by extreme frustration. Who can tell, one
such worker told the author, whether the knife-wielders are doing
this because they have lost their jobs, or been humiliated by an
Israeli settler, or what?
This may be, but the radicals inside the Strip do not view
it this way. To them, the knifings are a defense of the faith,
and, indeed, when one takes the broadest possible view of the
matter, there does seem to be an element of this involved. For
example, early in the intifadah, a Palestinian, riding a
municipal bus, wrested the wheel from the Israeli driver and
drove it over a cliff, killing 11 of the passengers aboard,
himself included.96 Was he frustrated over a job loss? He may have
been, but he took a purposeful and determined way of assuaging
his distress.
Another instance--in 1991, a Palestinian drove his truck
into a two Israeli cars, killing one of the Israeli drivers, and
then he dismounted from his vehicle and attempted to kill another
Israeli with a tire iron. Ultimately the man was shot to death by
bystanders.97

Indeed, the incident in December 1992 that set off the
deportation of 418 alleged Hamas members (the alleged kidnapping
of the border patrolman), can be seen as jihad, inasmuch as it
too was apparantly done on inspiration.
Until 1992, instances of impulse killings were rare and
could be dismissed as aberrations. However, by 1993 the toll from
such incidents had increased alarmingly. By March of that year 15
Israelis had died at the hands of knife-wielders. This so
disturbed Rabin that he ordered the complete closure of the
territories; henceforth no Palestinian could enter Israel to
work. Indeed, the very day that Rabin announced the ban, an Arab
youth, armed with two knives, stabbed nine passersby (killing
two) in south Tel Aviv. This was a particularly unsettling
incident because it took place in Israel proper, i.e., inside the
Green Line.98
The objection has been raised that stabbings and such cannot
possibly be jihad. After all, jihad is a concept with which the
West has some familiarity. Western scholars have discussed it in
terms of an actual holy war, something that conjures up the
picture of massed tribes sweeping across the desert, a la
Lawrence of Arabia and the march on Damascus. In the author's
opinion this is an out-of-date view; jihad, as it has come to be
practiced throughout the Middle East today, is a much more
complex phenomenon. At any rate, this is part of the problem: we
know far too little about Muslim practice; if we are to cope with
mounting violence in the region, we have to better understand
what is going on there.99
One last point to be made in this connection: Hamas seems
definitely to be part of the jihadist movement. Hizbollah is a
more problematical case. Inasmuch as the Hizbollahis identify
with the Iranians this would be natural. The Iranians have had a
successful religious revolt, and they have done it within the
context of Shia Islam. Therefore, the Iranian experience, and
indeed, the experience of all Middle Eastern Shias, is somewhat
set apart from that of the predominant Sunni community.
But in the long run the Sunni community is potentially the
greater threat to the West (if only because of the enormous
numbers of Sunnis worldwide). At present there seems little
likelihood of a Sunni revolt, on the order of that carried out by
the Iranian Shias in the late 1970s. At the same time, however,
the appearance of so many of these jihadist organizations, among
so many widely separated Sunni communities in the Middle East, is
disturbing.
The Islamic groups in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in
Algeria--these are all pursuing a course remarkably like that of
Hamas and the original jihadists in the occupied territories.100
How all these groups came to be, and why they are all coming into
being now, are questions which will have to be answered. One

thing seems certain, however; it does not appear that the
activity is being masterminded by a controlling entity. It would
be convenient if this could be proved, but, on the basis of the
evidence produced to date, this has not been be shown.
At the same time, it should be stressed that moderate
opinion among the Arabs is apparently abhorred by the jihadists.
The middle class throughout the Middle East and the Magreb, the
Arabs of the Gulf, and the traditional leadership of the PLO are
all very much against this developing radicalism. And this brings
us to the final section of the study, wherein we recommend ways
of combatting the phenomenon. We will focus here on ways to
counter Hamas and Hizbollah, the subjects of the study.
Recommendations.
After the announcement of the Declaration of Principles,
Hamas and Hizbollah kept a low profile, allowing the peace
process to unfold without obstruction. Clearly this was a stance
imposed on them by their followers. The Palestinians and the
Shias in southern Lebanon want the talks to succeed because, they
feel, this will improve their economic situation, and for them
this is the only thing that matters.
As long as it appeared that the talks were on track, and
matters were progressing smoothly, the radicals made no attempt
to interfere. They were mindful of the popular will that wanted
to wait and see how things would develop. Sabotaging the peace
process, which the people were banking on, was not a step which
anyone on the radical side wanted to take.
However, just recently Hamas perpetrated an outrageous
series of attacks. In one instance two young militants shot
wildly into a Jerusalem street, killing two passersby. Right
after that, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a bus in Tel
Aviv, killing 23 people. The Israeli government reacted to this
with intense anger. It broke off talks with the PLO, believing
(erroneously as it turned out) that the PLO indirectly had
contributed to the atrocities.
Subsequently, Rabin issued his official explanation of what
Hamas was trying to accomplish. It was, he said, trying to
sabotage the peace talks. We might have expected him to say
something like this; he is, at the moment, focussed on the talks,
and is doing all that he can to bring them to fruition.
But, if one reads the statements of the various Hamas
leaders--particularly those issued right after the bus affair-they are saying something quite different.101 They are expressing
satisfaction that, by the attacks, the honor of the Palestinian
community has been redeemed, after the Hebron massacre. It
appears that this is what is motivating Hamas. Hamas has taken on
itself the responsibility of avenging the community for attacks

by the Jewish settlers. Indeed, at the time of the Hebron affair,
Hamas said it would retaliate, and it would not be satisfied with
a single retaliatory action; it would deliver repeated blows to
the Jewish community.
The resistance against Israel has called forth a
counter-resistance among the Israeli religious forces. The two
groups are fiercely engaged in pursuing their personal vendettas,
unmindful--or disdainful--of attempts by the peace makers to
resolve this bitter struggle.
It seems to the author that the fight between the religious
forces has taken on a life of its own. It is not that the two
sides--settlers and Hamas operatives--are deliberately trying to
sabotage the talks; it is that, for them, the talks are
secondary. What really counts for the radicals--on both sides--is
destroying the enemy, or at least paying the enemy back for every
blow that has been inflicted.
In line with this, the recent kidnapping of an Israeli
soldier--and his subsequent killing--can be seen as activity
unrelated to the peace process. The Hamas operatives that seized
the Israeli were not--as Israeli officials maintained--trying to
derail the talks by their action. They wanted Israel to release
jailed Hamas members. Israel, after initially having promised to
let them go as part of the Declaration of Principles, then
reneged, and, since Arafat seemed incapable of inducing Rabin to
make good on his commitment, Hamas took this way of trying to
force the issue.
Ultimately, the real danger that the peace makers must face
is that this struggle will degenerate into a religious war. If
that happens, it will become vitually impossible to control
events. Already some quite elemental passions have been let
loose. The Temple Mount Faithful, Hamas, and groups like these,
are not receptive to reasoned argument. If they come to dominate
the struggle, chances of peace will fade away to nothing.
U.S. policymakers should be alert to this possibility, and
do all that they can to keep this from happening. This means
supporting the responsible forces, primarily the PLO. Americans
must see that the PLO stands for compromise, and ultimately,
hopefully, a peaceful solution. The alternative to it is Hamas,
and violence. This brings us to another related matter, which
bears upon the ability of the PLO to defuse the violence.
A major area of vulnerability in the process involves the
youth, particularly the gang leaders who took charge of the
intifadah under Israeli domination. If the PLO is to pacify the
areas under its control, it must take care of this element; it
needs to co-opt the youngsters, and to do so in a way that they
will accept. The youths want permanent jobs with some status
connected to them. Arafat is moving toward supplying this need.
However, a complication has arisen which could block his efforts.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is financing the PLO
administration, insists that Arafat submit detailed project
statements, which the IMF officials intend to scrutinize
carefully.102
From a good-government standpoint this may make sense, but
it is not the way things are done in the ghetto. It would be more
practical to allow Arafat to proceed however he deems fit. Let
him pay whomever he believes is worth supporting, whether that
individual is performing any useful labor or not. This type of
behavior is something the street understands, i.e., deferring to
the community's true leaders, those who by their actions can
ensure the success or failure of an undertaking.
U.S. policymakers must appreciate the role that the PLO has
agreed to play in pacifying the territories, something that not
even the Israelis could accomplish. It is a really dirty job that
Arafat has taken on. The only standard he should be held to is to
succeed; how he does it should not be an issue. If, later, it
develops that Arafat cannot do the job, other arrangements will
have to be made. But to expect the PLO to perform while under
close supervision by the IMF (or anyone else for that matter) is
unrealistic. This is not the sort of activity that can be
micro-managed from IMF headquarters in Washington.
In line with this, another proposal has been put forward
that needs consideration. It has been suggested that a way be
found to entice Hamas and Hizbollah into the talks. Some western
commentators believe that this is possible. They think
concessions to the radicals will induce them to act responsibly.
The author does not see the point in this. If the theory
outlined here is correct, the radicals are incapable of acting
responsibly. Only if they had control of the territories could
they do so, and we have seen that they do not have anything like
this authority. The radicals can enflame the mob to violence, but
that appears to be about the limit of what they are capable.
Moreover, why should they get involved, when to do so would
mean abandoning a strong position, which to date has proved
immensely successful? The radicals are seen as the alternative to
the PLO. To join the peace talks they would have to give up this
role; they would have to concede the direction of affairs to
Arafat, and this would virtually end their usefulness to the
community. U.S. policymakers should forget the radicals and keep
their focus on the PLO; that is the key to success. Any hope of
involving the radicals is a delusion.
The above recommendations relate specifically to the role of
Hamas and Hizbollah in the peace process. Clearly, however, the
groups have a significance beyond the immediate concern of the
talks. They can have an enormous impact on U.S. interests in the
whole Middle East area.

Hamas and Hizbollah are true radical organizations, in the
sense that they are out to destroy the system. They do not seek
to reform it. They may want to step into the shoes of the present
rulers, but they certainly will not maintain their pattern of
rule, should they take over.
To the degree that America's security position is buttressed
by having strong, friendly states in the Middle East, Washington
has an interest in preserving present arrangements. Just now,
there seems little likelihood of a widespread revolt. This is
because of factors alluded to above, namely the repugnance of
middle class elements for what is going on.
If, however, economic conditions in the area continue to
deteriorate, the attitude of the middle class will cease to count
for a great deal. Indeed, the class is growing increasingly
restive. The middle class in Algeria, for example, is apparently
set to emigrate to France, should the violence there continue.
Egypt recently witnessed a most ominous development. It was shown
that elements of the army have become implicated with the
radicals.103 It must not not be forgotten that religious
conspirators in the army killed former president Sadat.
It would be a catastrophe if one of America's allies
succumbed to the religious forces, as did the Shah of Iran in
1979. This would provide the radicals with a base from which to
expand their influence. Moreover, should the radicals take over
anywhere in the area, this would enhance their credibility; the
prospect of a radical religious government might then not seem so
remote to many.
In analyzing this situation, U.S. policymakers must be aware
that among the Muslims there are elements that are peaceable and
disposed to the West, and those that are unalterably opposed to
western influence. The latter category comprises groups like
Hamas and Hizbollah. The subversives are not like the
conservative sheikhs of al Azhar in Egypt, or the ulama of Saudi
Arabia. Whereas the latter could easily be led to cooperate with
the United States, the radicals would never do so. In the
radicals' eyes America is the Great Satan, and now--with the
Soviet Union gone--the principal enemy of the faith.
One other matter, which directly involves Americans, should
be considered. The Israelis appear to have developed a fail-safe
option to try if the PLO does not succeed in taking control of
the territories. By way of concluding the study, we will discuss
that now.
Americans on the Golan.
Recently the Israelis proposed that the United States
consider stationing troops on the Golan Heights, as a way out of
an impasse in the peace talks.104 It appears that Syria and Israel

are deadlocked on the question of Israeli troop withdrawals.
Syria wants the Golan returned immediately; Israel appears to
want to hand it over in phases, and only after Syria has agreed
to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.
Since, apparently, neither side will budge on this, Israel
has suggested putting U.S. forces on the Golan. Supposedly this
would overcome Syria's fear that Israel, after initially having
agreed to withdraw, would later change its mind. U.S. troops on
the Golan would also reassure the Israelis that Syria would not
attack from there, the American forces serving as a trip wire.
The stay of the Americans would be prolonged, perhaps as long as
20 years, and, although they might be part of a U.N. force, they
would be the centerpiece, probably in brigade strength.
There is some controversy over this proposition. There are
those who contend that such talk--of a U.S. force serving as a
tripwire--is meaningless. Should the Israelis and Syrians decide
to make peace, they certainly will do everything in their power
to see that it succeeds. The likelihood of Americans being at
risk from either side is not worth considering. Indeed, an
American presence on the Golan would be merely symbolic, a sign
of superpower backing for a deal that both sides know to be in
their best interest.
At the same time, however, others contend that American
peacekeepers would be exposed to danger, given the volatility of
local conditions. For example, President Assad apparently had a
heart attack in 1983, and subsequently fears have been expressed
about his continued good health.105 Were he to die, would his
successor be disposed to cooperate with Tel Aviv, or would he
seek to reassert the traditional enmity of Damascus towards the
Jewish state? No one knows the answer to this, because there does
not exist at present any clearly designated successor to Assad,
should the aging leader pass from the scene.
A similar problem exists on the Israeli side. Israel is
divided into two opposing political camps. There is the
nationalist Likud Party, and the dovish Laborites. The leader of
Likud has said, publicly, that he does not feel bound by any
concessions made by Labor to Damascus, and, were he to be elected
Israel's prime minister, he might seek to renegotiate the terms
of a Labor-brokered agreement.106 Were that to happen, what would
be the reaction of the Arab populations in the occupied
territories? Might they not take out their rage and frustation on
the American troop units in the area, as they did in 1983 in
Lebanon? After all, Washington has sponsored the peace process
from the very first, and is, in the minds of the natives at
least, responsible for its implementation.
The author believes an American force on the Golan is nearly
inevitable, given the apparent willingness of the Administration
to support the proposal.107 Therefore American military commanders
should prepare themselves for this eventuality. At the same time,

however, the modalities of the operation should be carefully
considered, with the idea of safeguarding U.S. forces kept
uppermost in mind.
The author feels that a commitment to station American
troops on the Golan should not be open-ended. A definite period
should be specified, preferably not too long. In addition, it
should be possible to withdraw the troops quickly and completely
without causing the peacekeeping force to disintegrate.
There are at present United Nations forces in place
throughout the region. It would seem desirable to exploit this
situation. For example, an American contingent on the Golan could
become part of UNDOF (the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force). The Americans would be there to support UNDOF, but would
not take over. Then, should the U.S. Congress--for whatever
reason--decide to bring the troops home, this could be done
expeditiously.
Moreover a small, truly symbolic, U.S. force would be
desirable from another angle: it would impress the parties that
more needs to be done to bring about peace than simply disengage
the opposing armies. This brings us to the last matter that needs
to be discussed.
In the author's view the Israelis' policy on the territories
is badly conflicted. They want to in-gather hundreds of thousands
of Jews, turning Israel into an exclusively Jewish enclave. At
the same time, they want to trade within the region, since this
is a way of becoming self-sustaining economically.
The continued incorporation of Jews means making more Arab
refugees (after all, the land of Israel is only so large; if
hundreds of thousands of Jews come in, hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians must leave). As additional refugees are dispersed
throughout the area, countries neighboring Israel will become
destabilized (as occurred with Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s);
countries that are disintegrating politically do not make good
trading partners.108
The area cannot afford to perpetuate the present violent
conditions. Stability must be achieved, and this can only come
about through some sort of economic union between Israel and its
neighbors. This is possible, but not until the refugee problem is
resolved and a peace settlement reached with the approval of key
Arab states.109
Ultimately it comes down to the problem of unemployed youth.
The mass of young people has to be accommodated. Youths who have
no hope of leading secure lives, who are deeply embittered
against authority, and who can only support themselves by hiring
out as mercenaries are always going to make trouble for the
Israelis--and indeed for the entire West.

Also, the Palestinians and Shias of southern Lebanon need to
have their status clarified: Who are they? What are they? To
which country do they belong? As long as such basic questions are
not answered, the radical religious forces will continue to gain
strength. These groups have found a formula to keep the region in
turmoil. Effectively, then, we are in a race to find a solution
before the area erupts into a holy war.
Earlier we mentioned the argument of the religious forces in
Israel, that God gave the land to the Jews, and we said that this
was to have unforeseen consequences. What has now happened is
that the Muslims have found a counterargument-- that the ummah is
sacred, and that no portion of it can ever be alienated from the
Islamic community.
It does not appear there is much time left to avoid a great
calamity. The author's final recommendation, therefore, is this-policymakers must not believe that the radical movement can be
neutralized by cutting off support from the Arab states. The
radicals will capitalize on setbacks to step up their recruiting
drive. Indeed, these groups have shown, over and over, that they
benefit from adversity, winning more converts.
Hamas, in particular, has proven extraordinarily resilient
in this respect; it has managed to keep itself going when
seemingly bereft of formal support from the Arab governments.
Hizbollah, on the other hand, is very dependent on both Iran and
Syria, but this does not mean that it could not emulate Hamas and
develop similar innovative strategies to survive. Recently,
Hizbollah ran candidates for Lebanon's parliament and was
impressively successful. The organization seems to be positioning
itself to continue as a political force in the area, even if
Damascus--and Tehran--withdraw their aid.
Summing up--in the end, making peace in the Middle East is a
problem of economics. The region cannot remain stable as long as
there are growing numbers of unemployed youths who not only do
not have jobs but--in the case of the Gazans--do not even have
recognized political status. Efforts to resolve the
socio-economic problems connected with this struggle must not be
ended once a formal peace treaty has been achieved. Peace is a
process that will not conclude until the area is on the road to
economic recovery, after the terrible devastation to which it has
been been subjected for almost a half century.
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doctors there treated him, but professed surprise that the UNRWA
officials would be concerned over a known collaborator. In
another instance, a teacher in a school in Gaza was killed, and,
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